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Introduction 
 
In this paper I look at identity choice and identity change in a situation of low 
intensity communal conflict where social boundaries are well defined and 
institutionalised, and symbolic boundaries sharply oppositional. The paper shows how 
individuals work on, change and negotiate group boundaries, creating spaces which 
are non-oppositional. This is also a form of identity change; I use the term to point to 
the whole package of feelings and dispositions as well as conceptual and perceptual 
frames which predispose towards opposition, and which are put in question and 
shifted in the process of change.
2 The paper shows some of the mechanisms involved 
in this process of identity/boundary change, not least the mechanisms by which 
‘contact’ may lead to change. It also shows the extent of practical and symbolic work 
required for identity change. It is useful to see identification and boundary making as 
social process, but the preconditions of the process need to be identified and they can 
be ‘sticky’, hard to change.
3 This paper reveals some of these preconditions through 
showing how some individuals change that process of boundary-making, practically 
disaggregating ‘groupness’ in their own social contexts, networks and life-paths. The 
case study is of Northern Ireland where, despite the peace process and recent 
settlement, this sort of change is rare.  
                                                 
2 I take ‘identity’ as the loosely knit set of embedded and embodied dispositions, feelings, values and 
assumptions about the world which guide the individual’s practice and form the embedded ‘frames’ 
which outlast immediate interactional contexts and generate dispositions to act within them: for such a 
concept of identity, and an argument that ‘identity’ in this sense forms an important part of the causal 
sequences involved in reproducing or changing group boundaries, see J. Todd, ‘Social transformations, 
collective categories and identity change’, Theory and Society, 34.4, 2005.  
3 When group boundaries come into play is a crucial issue. However a focus on the ‘when’ of 
boundaries requires also to look at the ‘what’ of them, for boundaries are more than the use of 
particular ‘labels’, rather they are complex modes of interaction and negotiation of interaction and even 
to identify them requires analysis of symbolic repertoires and preunderstandings.         GEARY WP/6/2006  3
The processes of symbolic and social assimilation between immigrant communities 
and host societies has been much studied.
4 Less studied are the ways in which 
boundaries change in situations of protracted ethno-communal conflict.
5  The reason 
is clear. They don’t change much, and those who breach or blur the boundaries may 
be killed or driven out. But the reasons for the entrenchment of these boundaries are 
of general theoretical as well as immediate political interest, and looking at the 
individual and exceptional cases may tell us much about boundaries in these societies, 
and perhaps throw a new light on boundaries in other cases too. For the purposes of 
this paper, and with the wider conceptual issues in view, I am going to narrow my 
focus to Northern Ireland, and to specific boundary-breaching processes in Northern 
Ireland.  
 
I begin with some general considerations about boundaries, boundary-blurring and 
boundary-breaching and the ways in which the Northern Ireland case may throw an 
interesting light on the literature. I go on to review some of the scholarly literature on 
identity change in situations of ethno-communal conflict, justifying the need for the 
qualitative approach taken here. After outlining my research methodology, I describe 
some cases of identity change beyond opposition, showing the ways in which 
symbolic boundaries are disaggregated, and identifying some of the conditions which 
                                                 
4 M. Lamont et al, ‘North African immigrants respond to French racism. Demonstrating equivalence 
through universalism’, Ethnic and Racial Studies. 25.3, 2002, pp. 390-414.  Richard Alba 2005 ‘Bright 
vs blurred boundaries: Second generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany and the 
United States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28 (1), pp. 20-49. A. Wimmer, ‘Does ethnicity matter? 
Everyday group formation in three Swiss immigrant neighborhoods’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 27.1, 
1-36.   More generally on social and symbolic boundaries, see M. Lamont and V. Molnar, ‘The study 
of boundaries in the social sciences’, Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 2002  
5 For examples of protracted conflict, see ex-Yugoslavia, Israel-Palestine, South Africa, Sri Lanka, or 
for a much less intense case, Canada. For studies of identity shift in situations of conflict see A. Rao, 
1999. ‘The many sources of identity: an example of changing affiliations in rural Jammu and Kashmir’, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22.1,  56-91. and Guy Ben Porat , ‘Dollar diplomacy: globalization, identity 
change and peace’, paper delivered at ITENIBA conference, Geary Institute, University College 
Dublin, Jan 26-7, 2005. On the concept of ‘change’ as opposed to situational variation and fluctuation 
of identifications (and by extension, boundaries) see Todd et al ‘Fluid or frozen? Choice and change in 
ethno-national identification in contemporary Northern Ireland’, unpublished manuscript.        GEARY WP/6/2006  4
facilitate it. This gives rise to some policy relevant conclusions for Northern Ireland,  
some conclusions specific to situations of ethno-national conflict, and some wider 
suggestions about identity change and symbolic boundaries.  
 
 
Identity change and symbolic boundaries 
 
There are several distinctive contextual features of the Northern Ireland case.
6 First, 
the social boundaries between the communities are well defined, and the symbolic 
boundaries even more so. There is no blurring or lack of definition. Where social 
boundaries relax enough to allow interaction, that interaction is constrained by the 
need to avoid topics of symbolic contention. Rosemary Harris, in a now-classic study 
of a small town North of the Irish border, pointed out that there was a Protestant and a 
Catholic perspective on just about every issue, including international relations, so 
that the frequent contact and civil interaction between Protestants and Catholics in the 
area seldom went beyond the most superficial of topics.
7 Today there is considerably 
more symbolic differentiation within each community, but areas of symbolic overlap 
are open only to relatively small numbers of the population and older symbolic 
oppositions remain powerful.
8 Second, boundaries are bright not because they are 
imposed but because they are embraced. The symbolic boundaries are not imposed 
simply or primarily by the dominant group: they are rather self-imposed. Catholics 
and nationalists do not wish to assimilate to the society-in-dominance, and do not 
                                                 
6 As always in Northern Ireland, every claim is debated. Because of constraints of space, I do not fully 
argue any of the points which follow in this paragraph. 
7 Rosemary Harris, 1972. Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbours and ‘Strangers’ in 
a Border Community. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
8 The narratives below show the power of symbolic oppositions even for those who are in process of 
changing them.      GEARY WP/6/2006  5
assimilate even when it is possible to do so.
9 There is therefore a symmetrical quality 
in the symbolic boundaries.   Third, the symbolic boundaries are multiply constituted. 
The boundary between ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’ is constructed at once from religion 
and ethnicity and morality and a sense of culture and politics and nationality. It is not 
a matter of adding other symbolic divisions onto an ‘essential’ ethnic one, but rather 
that they are interrelated, semi-fused, symbolically inter-resonating.
10  The result is a 
clear and stable boundary between ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’, but the reasons for and 
content of the distinction shift, with different aspects (religious, political, national) 
coming in and out of focus, highlighted or made recessive over time and for different 
sections of the populations. Fourth, the symbolic boundaries are differentially 
constructed from each ‘side’. Different values, different narratives with different 
periods of origin, different dimensions of difference, and different interpretations of 
these dimensions (what it means to be national) are involved in constructing the 
symbolic boundaries from each side. In this sense the boundary is asymmetrical and 





                                                 
9 Some social boundaries were primarily imposed by Protestants, sections of whom were active in 
ensuring population movement to ensure territorial segregation in the 1920s and again in 1969-70; for 
fifty years from the foundation of Northern Ireland, they closed the governing Unionist Party to 
Catholics. Yet in the school system, in medicine and in the service sector during the same period, 
Catholics self-excluded. Still today, Catholics are permitted to attend state (predominantly Protestant) 
schools but Protestants are not (except in very exceptional circumstances) permitted to attend Catholic 
schools. Discrimination was practiced by both communities, but since Protestants had control of most 
economic and political resources, they had more chance to be effective. In opinion polls, Catholics are 
somewhat more in favour of social mixing than are Protestants but this has not translated into key areas 
of social practice. There is a Catholic self-image of inclusivity but its function, whether genuine or a 
mode of cultural assimilation of Protestants, is much debated.   
10 Akenson, D.H., 1992. God’s Peoples. Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. well argues this for the colonial and religious dimensions, not just in 
Northern Ireland but also in Israel and in South Africa.  
11 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1991 pp.      GEARY WP/6/2006  6
All of this makes identity choice and boundary change quite different in the Northern 
Ireland case (and more generally in protracted ethnic conflicts) than in the case of 
immigrant and host populations. Alba distinguishes three types of boundary change: 
boundary breaching, where individuals assimilate to the dominant culture; boundary 
shifting, where socio-symbolic definitions of boundaries, who is and who is not 
included, change for whole populations; and boundary blurring, which is defined in 
several ways, either with individuals able to fit in either culture, sharing both sets of 
cultural repertoires (identity fluidity) or where some individual positions are 
ambiguous because the bounds of the culture are not well defined (boundary blurring) 
or where the distinction itself declines in salience (making boundaries recessive).
12 
Examples of each exist in Northern Ireland. Fifty years ago all mixed marriages were, 
and today some are, cases of boundary breaching, assimilation by conversion.
13 
Boundary shifting has occurred in the past; the ‘Protestant’ vs ‘Catholic’ boundary 
became clarified and defined as a national one in the nineteenth century; the wider 
Irish Protestant community was divided and a cohesive Ulster Protestant community 
emerged in the early twentieth century; in the last 30 years, unionism came to 
encompass Catholic as well as Protestant unionists. Boundary blurring also occurs. 
There are isolated cases of identity fluidity among for example, children of mixed 
marriage couples or individuals with extensive cross-border experience. The salience 
of the boundary remains very strong, but it is lessened in some contexts, for example 
in some sports. The boundaries are, however, typically well defined. It is hard to think 
                                                 
12 Alba, 2005, see footnote 5 
13 R. M. Lee, Mixed and Matched: Interreligious Courtship and Marriage in Northern Ireland. 
Lanham: University Press of America. 1994. Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance.  Valerie Morgan, Marie 
Smyth, Gillian Robinson and Grace Fraser, Mixed Marriages in Northern Ireland: Institutional 
Responses. Coleraine, Centre for the Study of Conflict, 1996.   .      GEARY WP/6/2006  7
of cases which are not ‘made to fit’.
14 This means that ‘boundary blurring’ cannot 
work with the given boundaries but has to change them, disaggregating the multiply 
defined boundaries, changing the form of groupness and in the process changing self-
definitions.  
 
The very fact of a multiply constituted symbolic boundary that is differently defined 
from each side gives potential for individuals to create a non-oppositional social and 
symbolic space. However this is more difficult in practice than it may appear 
conceptually. It is useful to think of three modes of change, sequenced in increasing 
radicalism.   
1.  Individuals can symbolically refuse the boundaries (‘I am not British or Irish, I 
am Northern Irish’; ‘I am not Protestant or Catholic, I am a plumber’) from 
within the existing social boundaries. Sometimes they negotiate for themselves an 
accepted place within one ‘group’, so that their symbolic refusal of division 
coexists with social reproduction of it.
15 Sometimes the tensions get too much and 
they leave Northern Ireland (the ‘exit’ option). Sometimes they are motivated to 
action which blurs the social boundaries. 
  
                                                 
14 Incomers are identified by the school they attend, so non-Catholic immigrants (Hindus, Chinese) go 
to state (predominantly Protestant) schools; non-religious individuals generally come from religious-
identifying families and are identified according to their background. Surveys and census use 
additional questions for those who define themselves as ‘non-religious’, asking variously about their 
community of origin or the community to which they feel closest. These questions are deemed 
necessary in order to see if the economic and social advantage of the Protestant community (and 
‘cultural Protestants’ are disproportionately likely to say they are non-religious) has or has not been 
eroded.  
15 In much social interaction in Northern Ireland, this potential is symbolically exploited without 
breaching boundaries. So, for example, Protestant, Irish-identifying unionists often negotiate for 
themselves a comfortable place within the networks and understandings of unionism and Protestantism 
while occasionally being ‘claimed’ by nationalists as potential assimilators. How this negotiation takes 
place - how ‘eccentrics’ within each group keep a place in that group – is worth study but is not the 
topic of the present paper.       GEARY WP/6/2006  8
2.  Individuals can focus their activity in those spheres or institutional sites where 
social boundaries overlap and ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’ interact freely: boxing 
and business, ice-skating, community work and university are such sites, as well 
as some other sports and explicitly cross-community political and educational 
ventures.
16  This involves a radical decline in the salience of the boundaries. 
However the range of such activities is limited: when ice-skaters or 
businesspeople have children and have to decide what names to give them, 
whether and what religious formation to give them, and what school to send them 
to, social boundaries return in high salience.
17 If some reproduce the boundaries 
of their own socialisation, others convert: mixed marriages and conversion of one 
or other partner were always present in Ireland.
18 Others go a step further to crisis 
and more radical change.  
3.  Some individuals come radically to disaggregate symbolic boundaries while 
socially breaching and blurring the new multiple boundaries, with a concomitant 
helter-skelter of identity change. These are the individuals on whom I focus in 
this paper.  The schematic logic of such a process is clear. Individuals separate 
out the distinct symbolic dimensions which constitute the boundary, changing on 
one dimension (nationality or politics) more than another (religion) and thus 
coming to straddle a more complex set of boundaries. In their own practice 
transform a singular multiply-determined boundary into multiple boundaries with 
many overlaps. They blur some symbolic divisions, heighten others, while the 
resonance of each begins to change as it is disaggregated from the others. The 
multiplication of boundaries gives possibilities for many more forms of blurring, 
                                                 
16 F. Cochrane, ‘Unsung Heroes’, in McGarry ed. Northern Ireland and the Divided World, Post 
Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
17 See Claire Mitchell,  Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging 
and Belief, Aldershot, Ashgate 2006       . 
18 R. M. Lee, Mixed and Matched. Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance,.      GEARY WP/6/2006  9
crossing and shifting. But if this is a schematic model of possible change, does it 
capture key features of actual cases and processes of change? And if so, what of 
the social conditions and resources which favour or facilitate such change, the 
reasons it is so infrequent, and the sorts of political interventions which might 
facilitate such processes among more sections of the population?   
 
Identity change in situations of ethno-national conflict.  
 
 
There is relatively little discussion of identity change in situations of ethno-national 
conflict. The most interesting and best developed section of the literature focuses on 
the movement towards opposition, the crystallisation of oppositional categories, what 
may be called ‘essentialisation’ where collective categories take on personal 
significance and oppositional content.
19 This process whereby a trait or category with 
which identification had been implicit, ‘banal’ or empty of content, becomes 
highlighted, crystallised and imbued with oppositional personal meaning is common 
in situations of ethnic conflict.
20 Examples are typically associated with the 
experience (direct or indirect) of injury, humiliation or stigmatisation, where the 
stigmatised category is taken on as a way of asserting dignity and value.
21  The 
attitudes and actions of others provoke one into crystallising identity for oneself.
22  
Kakar vividly describes the stories which served this function in his own youth.
23  
                                                 
19 Petersen, Roger D. 2002. Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth 
Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. S. Kakar, The Colors of Violence, 
Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict (Chicago:  Chicago University Press, 1996).  
Horowitz, D. L., 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press ,   ;  
20 Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence. Kakar, The Colors of Violence.  
21 M. Lamont and C. Bail, ‘Sur les frontières de la reconnaissance. Les categories internes et externes 
de l’identité collective’, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 21, 2005,  pp. 61-90. 
22 cf Jenkins, R. 1996 Social Identity  London: Routledge Jenkins 
23 Kakar, Colors of Violence.     GEARY WP/6/2006  10 
Such cases were common in our research, not always so violent and intense but – 
even when simply experienced slights and humiliations – remembered.
 24  The process 
of ‘essentialisation’ begins when an underlying cultural trait – typically not a strong 
identification – is taken as the grounds of injury or stigma. It is by identifying with 
and affirming the value of that trait that self-respect is re-gained, at the cost of an 
oppositional identification.  A dynamic of opposition then begins. In some of the 
literature, it is suggested that a strong identification is pre-given, then fired by the 
incident.
25 Logically, however, it does not have to be pregiven. All that is necessary is 
that it be among the available repertoires for the individual. These repertoires can be 
available in the general culture, or in the family tradition, they do not need to be 
adopted by the individual prior to the episode; they may rather be grasped to explain 
an otherwise incomprehensible episode and to legitimate the stigmatised position.
26  
The sequencing is significant: since collective identity is ascribed before it is 
affirmed, the reaction may also affect those who are willing to blur boundaries. If 
change away from opposition is rare, it may in part be because the conditions of 
essentialisation are so common and can interrupt incipient processes of boundary 
blurring.  
 
                                                 
24 Discussed with examples in Todd et al, ‘Fluid or frozen:  …’  
25 Petersen and Horowitz’s examples tend to assume this. It was not, however, the case in our own 
interviews where the examples were of individuals either too young to have any clear sense of 
boundaries (as in Kakar’s case), or already open to blurring of boundaries, to friendships and intimacies 
across the social and symbolic divide.  
26 In one of my interviews in 1988 a Catholic woman (‘Elise’) expressed a very strong Irish 
identification and political support for Sinn Féin while this was still an ‘extreme’ and marginalized 
party. She pinpointed the episode fifteen years previously where this strong Irish identification 
crystallised: a close relative shot dead by the British army, herself as a teenager humiliated in public by 
British authority and Protestant peer when she tried to describe what had happened. This woman’s 
family had themselves been culturally divided, with one branch strongly republican, another apolitical 
and pragmatic and as a child she recounted being open, apolitical, following her father’s pragmatism: 
the episode changed her personal way of balancing these divisions.      GEARY WP/6/2006  11 
Analysis of movement away from oppositional identities and understandings is much 
less frequent. It is sometimes discussed in terms of revising national narratives to 
provide inclusive rather than exclusive and oppositional repertoires of understanding 
collective history.
27 The portrayal of extremists as trapped in myth, and the need to 
break from such myths, has been common in much of the literature on ethnic 
conflict.
28 In both states in Ireland a concerted political effort to change the national 
narrative in order to reduce oppositional understandings of identity is underway. 
There has been a revision of historical understandings, a rewriting of school history 
texts, a new teaching of ‘civic education’ and ‘education for mutual understanding’, 
and, in the Irish state, a strong media attempt to change understandings in order to 
recognise unionists’ British identity.
29   Clearly the provision of alternative repertoires 
of understanding and interaction may facilitate identity change. However the hopes 
invested in historical revisionism and the retelling of collective memories are 
sometimes over-blown. If individuals sometimes reinterpret their experiences in terms 
of new national narratives, this activity requires a certain calm and space for 
reflection. The situations of essentialisation described above are ones where the 
opposite sequence takes place: individuals reach for national narratives to fit their 
experiences. As I have argued elsewhere, actors in Northern Ireland reached for 
mythological national/ethnic narratives not because they were old-fashioned, but 
                                                 
27 See Grillo, R., 1998. Pluralism and the Politics of Difference. Oxford: Clarendon . This position 
follows easily from an ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism, see Smith, A. D.,  1986. The Ethnic 
Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. In effect, the national narratives provide the repertoire for 
understanding the present. Greenfeld, L. (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press) sees the different values embodied in different narratives and rhetorics as 
typical of the different nationalisms. Walker Connor in Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994,  tends to take nationalist rhetoric as 
indicative of the understandings of ‘everyday nationals’.  
28 ‘Ancient hatreds’ interpretation of ex-Yugoslavia and of Northern Ireland.  See O’Malley, P. 1990  
Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair. Belfast: Blackstaff   see 
Garvin on myth. . For critiques with respect to the  Northern Ireland literature, see Ruane and Todd,  
and McGarry and O’Leary.    
29 Roy Foster, Community Relations Council, etc.. See Iseult Honohan’s November 2005 conference 
on civic education in Ireland in the Humanities Institute of Ireland, University College Dublin.     GEARY WP/6/2006  12 
because they needed them to fight for their interests and to explain and legitimate 
their personal stories and experiences.
30 Exactly how the re-telling of national 
narratives affects national identity is an important area of research. My point here is 
simply that it is only one possible factor favouring change to non-oppositional 
identities, whose importance has to be seen empirically, in the accounts of those who 
have changed.  
 
There are also large-n studies of movement away from opposition. The ‘contact 
hypothesis’ has been revived in social psychology, where it has recently been shown 
that sustained contact on issues of significance does tend to decrease exclusivity 
between groups.
31 Varshney’s work can be taken as backing for this view: cities 
where civil society institutions promote sustained cross community contact tend to 
have less serious intercommunal tension than others.
32 What these studies do not 
show, however, is the direction of causality. Varshney’s work has been criticised for 
suggesting that ‘bridging’ social capital lessens conflict, when one might equally 
argue that low conflict allows the building of bridging social capital.
33 We need to be 
able to identify the process by which contact decreases opposition, the mechanisms at 




                                                 
30 J. Ruane and J. Todd, ‘Why can’t you get along with each other?’ in E. Hughes, ed., Culture and 
Politics in Northern Ireland, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1991, 24-43..  
31 Reference, Cairns et al. 
32 Varshney, A. (2001) ‘Ethnic conflict and civil society: India and beyond’, World  
Politics, 53(3), pp. 362-398. John Darby showed something very similar in Northern Ireland in his 
qualitative study, Intimidation and the Control of Conflict, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1986. See A. 
Wimmer. ‘Does ethnicity matter?’ 
33 I owe this point to Christopher Farrington, .     GEARY WP/6/2006  13 
Another important comparative theoretical perspective focuses on power relations as 
key factors in embedding identities, and hypothesises that changing power relations 
are key factors in changing identification.
34 Greif and Laitin have recently given very 
plausible comparative over-time evidence for this in changing linguistic practices.
35 
Once again, however, the significance of this change and the causal mechanisms at 
work require further clarification. In principle, as I have argued elsewhere, changing 
power relations provide a trigger for identity change – not least by creating cognitive 
dissonance between old assumptions and values and new social practices -  but do not 
determine its direction.
36 While in the case cited, linguistic change may have involved 
assimilation to the dominant culture, this is not always the case. In Ireland, for 
example, recognition of new opportunity structures in the nineteenth century led to a 
mass popular switch to the English language; this was, however, concomitant with an 
increasingly intense national identification, in opposition to British rule and later to 
British culture. Radical linguistic change affected identification much less than might 
have been expected: the linguistic aspect of identification became recessive while 
other aspects – history, culture, values – were given prominence, thus allowing 
masses of individuals to pursue their strategic interests without identity conversion.
37  
 
All of this suggests that the existing literature on identity change and boundaries in 
situations  of  ethno-national  conflict,  has  to  be  supplemented  with  analyses  of 
processes of change, of the repertoires called upon in these processes, and of the 
                                                 
34 This approach derives proximately from Pierre Bourdieu. See, Lamont and Molnar, ‘Boundaries’. A. 
Wimmer, ‘The making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries’ manuscript.  J. Ruane and J. Todd, ‘The 
roots of intense ethnic conflict may not themselves be ethnic’, Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, 
45.2, 2004,  
35 Greif, A. and Laitin, D.D. (2004) ‘A Theory of Endogenous Institutional  
Change’, American Political Science Review, 98(4), pp. 633-652APSR 
36 Todd, ‘Social transformations’.  
37 That the case is a complex one, and subject of disputes among scholars as to the significance of the 
changes, is precisely my point: significance for identity cannot be read off from behavioural change, 
even linguistic change.      GEARY WP/6/2006  14 
sequences in which change occurs and the precise mechanisms which appear to be at 
work  in  individual  cases.    This  is  doubly  important,  not  just  to  show  the  causal 
processes at work, but also to throw light on possibilities of recidivism. Part of the 
value of individual interviews is to reveal the self-understood process of change in a 
way  which  allows  us  to  see  the  thresholds  beyond  which  it  becomes  difficult  to 








I present in summary form some descriptions of radical identity shift from 
oppositional to non-oppositional forms of identity. These are drawn from in-depth 
interviews which were conducted in 2004-5 as part of a wider research project funded 
by the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation.
38 In this project, 128 interviews 
were conducted, 54 in Northern Ireland.  The interviews followed a common topic 
guide designed to elicit the content of ethno-national identity and perceived changes 
over time and generations.
39 A minority of these interviews (16 in all) were with 
individuals in mixed (Protestant-Catholic) marriages, their parents and their children. 
This group was chosen because we expected that these individuals would report 
considerable change in their construction of their identity and the interviews 
confirmed this. Two further sets of interviews form the background of this discussion. 
One study comprised over 100 interviews in three locations North and South (of 
which 26 in Northern Ireland) between 2003-5, in an open-ended format designed to 
                                                 
38 ‘Intergenerational transmission and ethno-national identity in the (Irish) border area’, funded by the 
EU programme for peace and reconciliation.  
39 The interviewees ranged over the local political spectrum, and there was a representative age-, 
gender-, generation- and religion- distribution. The middle class was over-represented in this sample. 
Interviewers were Nathalie Rougier, Lorenzo Cañás Bottos and the author, interviewed most of the 
mixed marriage families.      GEARY WP/6/2006  15 
tap into all aspects of identity, not primarily ethno-national.
40 The final set of 
interviews – 80 in all - were conducted by two researchers in Northern Ireland during 
a period of intermittently intense violence, in the first six months of 1988. These 
interviews were designed to reveal individuals’ perspectives on the conflict; prompts 
covered their sense of national identity.
41 
 
Out of this very large sample, there were many narratives which showed occasions of 
choice and change and many respondents claimed to be tolerant, non-oppositional in 
their identification.
42 Explicit narratives of change from oppositional to non-
oppositional identities were rare. I report on some of these cases below, attempting to 
draw out their logic. Names and identifying details are changed. The analysis that 
follows focuses primarily on the narratives of four women, each of whom happens to 
be in a mixed (Protestant-Catholic) marriage. What is being studied, however, is not 
mixed marriage but the process of boundary crossing and its relations to self-
understood identity change. The analyses below are therefore intended as analyses of 
‘logic’ of identity change, rather than the logic of mixed marriages.
43   
  
                                                 
40 This study covered a very wide range of diverse social categories. The interviewer was Theresa 
O’Keefe. Analysis is only beginning, but I have read through many of the interviews and discussed 
them with Dr O’Keefe.    
41 The interviewers were the author and J. Ruane. These interviews were not taped but the interviewers 
recounted them onto tape immediately afterwards and transcribed this account subsequently. The 
individuals were representative in gender, political and religious distribution; interviewees were 
predominantly but not exclusively middle class in social position but there was class representativeness 
in terms of social background.  
42 Todd, Rougier, O’Keefe and Cañás Bottos, ‘Fluid or frozen? Choice and change in ethno-national 
identification in contemporary Ireland’, unpublished manuscript.. 
43 About 10% of marriages in NI are mixed, although measurement is contested and significant 
numbers of these cases involve the ‘conversion’ of one partner. See Robinson et al, Mixed Marriages, 
and R. M. Lee, Mixed and Matched.  While there are analogies between mixed marriages in Northern 
Ireland and in other situations, I do not explore them here. ,      GEARY WP/6/2006  16 
 
 
Identity change, process and logic       
 
Four narratives of change
44 
 
Denise grew up in a unionist and evangelical-pietist Protestant family, in a strongly 
unionist neighbourhood in Belfast. She has changed ‘absolutely fundamentally’ on 
national identification. ‘I’ve got both a British and an Irish passport. .. if you did push 
me I would probably say I have probably more Irish leanings, probably sort of more 
nationalist than unionist leanings at the moment but sort of the jury’s still out..’. 
Change began in childhood with visits to cousins in the South of Ireland and she ‘just 
got caught up in a more relaxed lifestyle, especially compared to how things were up 
here in the Troubles...’.   ‘I probably felt a great deal of affinity for Irish culture then’.  
As  a  teenager  she  experienced  ‘ethnic  cleansing’  as  Catholics  in  her  loyalist 
neighbourhood were killed or intimidated out.  ‘And I remember an increasing sense 
of, you know, feeling that this was totally horrendous and that I really didn’t want to 
live here anymore if this was going on and feeling ashamed as well, ashamed of being 
Protestant.’  As a young adult she decided to do a course in the Irish language at a 
cross-community college: her teacher was ‘very winning, she kept you entranced for 
the full two hours…’.  A defining moment occurred after the course was over when 
she saw her teacher on television as a leading member of Sinn Féin: ‘I had been 
brought up with a stereotype of a Sinn Féin person as an absolute monster, you know, 
and then on the other hand I had X who was a very friendly, amicable woman and … I 
                                                 
44 The interviews to be discussed here were selected because of the extent of change reported. The 
relation  with  the interviewer  in these cases  (also a  woman,  mother,  in  a mixed  marriage) did not 
involve the negotiation of gender or generational differences; religious differences or similarities (the 
interviewer is from Northern Ireland and thus identifiable in religious origin) were not highlighted in 
the interviews themselves.  The interviewees were asked how they categorized themselves in national 
and religious terms, what this meant to them, and how far it had changed: In all cases, this produced a 
set of episodic narratives.      GEARY WP/6/2006  17 
couldn’t reconcile the monster with... this lovely amicable woman who would have 
listened while I chatted away… I had an awful time trying to reconcile the two… I 
came to the conclusion...that … I didn’t agree with her politics but it didn’t mean that 
I didn’t like the person… that she wasn’t a monster…’  Now she herself teaches an 
evening class in West Belfast. When I asked her what she thought of the republican 
murals and symbolism which are pervasive there, she said that she did not notice 
them,  although  once  she  would  have  found  them  intimidating.  She  remains  a 
religiously committed Protestant; she is married to a Catholic and has a young child; 
she keeps in close contact with her family of origin, frequently visiting her mother 
who still lives in the same unionist neighbourhood .  
 
Brenda,  from  Protestant  East  Belfast,  began  to  see  things  differently  through  her 
participation in handball, a sport which was predominantly ‘Catholic’ which allowed 
her to ‘widen her horizons’. Marriage followed to a national handball champion. A 
personal  crisis  preceded  the  baptism  of  their  first  child.  Initially  she  delayed  the 
baptism:    ‘I  felt  …  something  innate.  I  didn’t  want  my  children  brought  up 
Catholics…’.    Yet the decision could not be delayed, for infant baptism was a crucial 
sacrament to her Catholic in-laws and her husband. Finally, having assessed the costs 
to the extended family and to her marriage, she overrode her ‘innate’ feelings and 
allowed the baptism, ‘trusting’ that it was the right decision. The outcome was (on her 
account) both unconventional and happy. This so confirmed her in her choice that she 
now sees the main cause of conflict in Northern Ireland as such  ‘ignorance’, the 
‘innate’ prejudices which prevent individuals from encountering difference, in her 
own metaphor the insistence on  ‘eating fish and chips’ in a foreign country.  
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 Sara – from a strongly Catholic Irish nationalist background in Dublin – was sent by 
her parents to a predominantly Protestant school. Her personal constructs of (national) 
self  and  other  followed  quite  closely  the  national  trajectory,  which  she  followed 
closely on the  media:  ‘as a younger child it  was very much put across that the 
English was the bad guy.. .. around the time... of the bad troubles up North and then 
the H-Blocks and the bombings, it was suddenly the IRA were the bad guys.. I think it 
only became full circle for me... at the time of the peace treaty…  you could suddenly 
see both sides.’  Interspersed with this history is her marriage and increasing contact 
with  the  unionist  perspective  of  some  of  her  in-laws.  She  retains  a  strong  Irish 
identity, in an ethno-cultural form, which she holds separate from her political and 
lifestyle decisions. She and her husband differ ethno-culturally, and converge in most 
other respects. Her children are raised in an international environment.  
 
Jane – from a Catholic Southern-border-county background – came to live in Belfast 
because her teenage friends had chosen to come to university there and she followed 
them. Living in Belfast made her reflect on her national identity in a way that she 
never had and never had wanted to before. ‘.. it was more practical reasons that you 
had to become aware of what you are. Whereas in A-town really while everybody else 
is the same as you and is in the same category as you sure it didn’t matter where you 
go or who you talk to’.  For her, identity change began with the shock of encountering 
difference: first simply living with social divisions in Belfast, and later in relation to 
her Protestant East Belfast future husband: ‘we kept fighting, we were opposite ends of 
the  same  continuum  if  you  like,  you  know,  on  very  similar  constructs,  sport  or 
religion.. I used to think god I loved him so much and I thought will this ever work, 
can  this  work?’  For  her,  identity  change  involved  a  gradual  relativising  of  her     GEARY WP/6/2006  19 
identification and perspectives, a recognition that quite radical national, religious and 
cultural difference could coexist with moral convergence.  
 
Other narratives of change in our interviews share some of these characteristics. 
Sara’s husband John traced quite radical changes in his own political views and sense 
of history. Barbara, a Protestant who lives on the Northern side of the Irish border, 
interviewed by Nathalie Rougier, traced a change in her own identity from British to 
Irish: she separated from her strongly loyalist Protestant husband, took on a job as a 
community worker, and is now learning Irish and Ulster Scots and reinterpreting her 
familial and the collective history. In her new work, she associates with all types of 
nationalists (she described community events where she dances on a regular basis 
with a local Sinn Féin representative). This has led her to moral questioning and the 
beginnings of a recategorisation not just of republicanism but even of her ex-
husband’s ‘extreme’ loyalist views. Catriona, a Catholic from West Ulster 
interviewed in 1988, was alienated from her nationalist background by the behavior of 
republicans, and began building a new set of Northern Irish reference points through 
feminist and cross-community activity. Anne, from a fundamentalist Protestant 
background, cast off both her religion and the political oppositions associated with it 
in a marriage outside the fundamentalist fold.  
 
If these individuals willingly embraced change, the parents of mixed marriage 
families had change thrust upon them, and they reacted in different ways. Susan, 
interviewed by Nathalie Rougier, discussed her feelings of distress when her 
daughter, in a mixed Catholic-Protestant relationship, became pregnant:   …’  but I 
have an issue now myself… I have a daughter who… she is not married but she is living with 
her companion who is a protestant… and she is also expecting a baby… and for me that is     GEARY WP/6/2006  20 
raising a lot of issues in what I believe and what I don’t believe… I always felt that I would be 
broad minded about it… but I find I’m not… and I’m quite saddened by that, I am… because I 
don’t want to be like that…’   and later ‘I thought I was so broad minded and so liberal but 
then it hits… it hits your own front door, it makes you think and… as I say I want to, I want to 
be understanding, I’m trying to be understanding but it still hurts…’. 
45  
 
The narratives of change are also echoed politically. One unionist politician described 
a ‘dark night of the soul’ before he decided to support the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998: his emotions and loyalties to friends killed by the IRA warned him against 
compromise with Sinn Féin but he finally decided that peace was the higher value and 
he became a wholehearted supporter of the agreement.
46 New loyalists, with links to 
Protestant paramilitaries but pro-Agreement, have similar narratives.
47  
 
Sequences of change, logic of change 
 
In these cases, the occasion of change is contact across social boundaries which 
generates experience that demands decision, provokes crisis, and may lead to identity 
change.
48 In several of these cases, the experience which provoked change was close 
and civil contact with those defined as terrorists  (Sinn Féin); in others it was a matter 
of the ethno-religious future of the next generation (the baptism of children of a mixed 
marriage). In each of these cases, the boundaries were breached in practice and 
experience before the oppositional ‘prejudices’ were changed in personal 
understanding. The identity change that was provoked was gradual for Sara, Jane and 
Barbara, and punctual and crisis-ridden for  Denise, Brenda and Catriona.  
                                                 
45 This interview is significant because it shows how a trigger of change may be experienced, before it 
becomes clear if or how far change will proceed. 
46  
47 David Ervine, ‘Redefining loyalism’ in John Coakley, ed,  Changing Shades of Orange and Green: 
Redefining the Union and the Nation in Contemporary Ireland  Dublin, UCD Press, 2002,  pp. 57-63. 
48 Ethnic cleansing presupposes boundary crossing and Denise knew the Catholic killed on her street.      GEARY WP/6/2006  21 
In both sets of cases, it generated a new set of practices and experiences and an 
ongoing process of recategorisation. 
 
Contact alone does not generate change. It makes more likely experiences which 
generate a whole series of cognitive and moral dissonances, which show that the 
elements of identity that had previously been tied together have to be pulled apart. For 
Denise, the first dissonance was between her sense of moral and religious values and 
her sense of religious collective identity: when her Catholic neighbour was killed by 
paramilitaries acting in the name of Protestants she felt ‘ashamed of being 
Protestant’. A later dissonance was between her sense of political morality and her 
sense of personal values: republicans were outside the bounds of her politico-moral 
imagination, yet her teacher was clearly within the bounds of her personal-moral 
universe. For Brenda the dissonance was between her ‘innate’ feelings and her 
rationally considered family values. For Jane her clear recognition of her partner’s 
moral standards and moral worth required her to recognise the entwining of her own 
moral standards with her sense of nationality, religion and culture.  For Sara the 
dissonance was interpersonal: her extended family spanned the entire range of British-
Irish relations, from republican to unionist and while she was able to interact with 
them all, she communicated clear satisfaction when her historical understanding 
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A changed moral community 
 
What is thrown into crisis in the narratives above is the relevant moral community, 
the boundaries of intelligible moral behavior. The boundary blurring that takes place 
is not a taking on of another set of cultural norms or values, although it may in some 
cases come to involve this. It is rather a finding of potentially share-able moral (or 
sometimes religious) values that allow for a ‘fusion of horizons’ (as Gadamer called 
the quest for interpretative understanding ). Denise’s move from a strong political-
moral-identitarian aversion to republicans to a simple political disagreement with 
them was triggered by a contradiction between her recognition of another’s humanity 
(and human warmth, openness, decentness) and her oppositional categories. For 
Barbara, when she begins to question her previous categorisation of Sinn Féin, she 
equally begins to question her categorisation of her own ex-husband. For Brenda, the 
baptism of her first child was a major moral decision where stronger values won out 
over the innate reaction: the child was baptized in a Catholic church ‘out of my 
greater love for John, and for the unity of the family’ and she could only ‘trust’ she 
was making the right decision.. For Jane, it was her husband’s strong moral values, 
her sense of him as ‘very, very decent and kind and I would trust him in any situation 
to do the right thing’ that sustained her and allowed her to work to recategorise 
religious and cultural opposition as mere difference. For Sara, it was all-important to 
be ‘open’ rather than ‘boxed’, this lay behind her on-going revisions of her ‘Irish’ 
identity and sense of history. In all of these cases, the individual prioritised a set of 
sharable values over the values entwined in the oppositional category, separating 
personal values from the ethnic or national category, and allowing the oppositional 
identification to be criticised and changed at the same time as the boundaries became 
permeable.      GEARY WP/6/2006  23 
 
This was, however an achievement rather than a foregone conclusion. Some 
respondents alternated between different evaluative repertoires, one more oppositional 
and one more open, without resolving the potential tension. Elise, mentioned above 
(footnote 22) as the respondent who had undergone an intense essentialising 
experience, tempered her strong nationalist opposition to British and unionist values 
with what she saw as her father’s open and pragmatic perspective. When interviewed 
in 1988 she was in a relationship with a Protestant, and wondered if it would be better 
for herself and her children to assimilate to his ‘culture-in-dominance’. It was not at 
time of interview clear if or how Susan, whose daughter was pregnant, would change 
her own values to accept the child of a mixed relationship.   
 
Self-repositioning and the retelling of familial and national narratives  
 
In none of the cases discussed above did the individuals convert to the entire package 
of  beliefs  and  values  of  the  other  community.  Nor  did  they  broaden  to  a  fully 
universalistic or cosmopolitan position.
49 In each case it was a repositioning of self 
within a reinterpreted tradition, an imaginative reforming of the Protestant or Catholic 
tradition. Change was so painful and difficult for many of our respondents because 
they insisted on changing while retaining their earlier (familial and sometimes also 
neighbourhood) relationships. They did not reject the relatives who refused to come to 
their  weddings  or  who  insulted  them  and  their  partners;  they  returned  to  them, 
reforming  relations  with  them  while  insisting  that  their  own  changes  also  be 
recognised. In these interviews, they were successful: initial alienation was overcome, 
                                                 
49 Out of the 127 recent interviews that have been analysed, we only had one interviewee (a Northerner 
who had moved over the border to the South) who did not declare himself British or Irish or Northern 
Irish but a ‘citizen of the world’, and even he remained firmly Protestant, and one other who saw 
herself as primarily European.      GEARY WP/6/2006  24 
and the four women above and their partners achieved not simply different social 




This  mode  of  identity  change  is  best  seen  as  a  revision  of  priorities,  values  and 
perceptions, a rebuilding of the identity boat while one is sailing in it, reaching for 
resources and repertoires with which one feels at home, albeit ones which were in the 
past kept recessive: in this way, it is change while retaining a sense of continuity with 
tradition.
51 In each  case, the  individual reassimilated their own process of change 
within a longer and larger tradition by retelling of the familial, and sometimes also the 
national, identity narrative.
52 Denise emphasised the border-crossings in her family 
history; Barbara retraced her family history to find a grandmother who had lived in 
Dublin and her ‘ethnic’ history to show the interlocking unity of all the peoples of the 
Britain and Ireland. Others found incidents in the past that might have led to a similar 
outcome.   Denise’s husband spoke of his aunt, who wanted to marry a Protestant and 
was  not  permitted  by  her  family;  Susan,  worried  about  her  daughter’s  baby, 
remembered back to her own relationship with a Protestant boy in Belfast thirty years 
ago. It is as if the changes and turning points in the present encouraged the extended 
family to find also potential – failed - turning points in the past. Some – in particular 
Sara, her husband and many of their extended family – also brought in the wider 
national historical narrative, revising this in different ways to show the paradoxes and 
cross-currents in the past as in their own present.  All of this functioned as a way of 
asserting identification with the family (and national) tradition and allowing family 
                                                 
50 See Robinson et al. Mixed Marriages 
51 Todd, ‘Social transformation’ .  
52 Cerulo, Karen A. 1997. ‘Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions’. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 23: 385-409. In the cases reported here, the new narrative accompanied the interactional 
change, or followed it and legitimated it..      GEARY WP/6/2006  25 
(and national) resources to legitimate change towards a more inclusive identity, while 
situating that change and giving it wider social significance.  
 
Renegotiation of boundaries   
 
The result is a renegotiation of boundaries.  
 
i.  Symbolic boundaries. For those most centrally involved, symbolic 
boundaries become multiple and distinct. For Sara and John, religious 
boundaries had lost salience, national boundaries remained clear, distinct, 
unchangeable, but without implications for interaction, political boundaries 
were constantly in process of revision, cultural boundaries had blurred over 
time and there was a fusion of moral horizons. For Denise and Colm, Brenda 
and Paul, religious boundaries remained salient and clear, but with a sharing 
of key beliefs, while there was convergence in national, political, and 
cultural positions. For their children, the ‘packages’ of religio-national-
political-cultural-moral positions, which in the wider society constitute 
bright boundaries, had no symbolic hold. They freely chose position on each 
dimension, feeling no internalised constraint to follow any package; at the 
limit they had multiple repertoires and moved fluidly between them.  
ii.  Social boundaries. At the level of the immediate and the extended family, 
change is radical, in social mixing and interaction, in the free movements of 
the immediate family from one side to another of the boundaries with the 
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iii.  Social boundaries. At the wider social level, boundaries remain and are 
resented.
53 Mixed marriage respondents have to be careful where they live. 
One couple had just bought a house in an expensive (religiously mixed, 
middle class) locality, having walked away from a good cheaper house 
because they had seen a loyalist flag further up the street. One family much 
resented the Catholic church’s rules precluding them from sharing 
communion. The son of a mixed marriage couple  – himself with a fluidity 
of religious identity, with both Protestant and Catholic repertoires easily 
available to him – had to hide his background from some Protestant fellow 
students. One mixed marriage couple were angry that their daughter’s right 
to attend religion class at school had been questioned. One man was angry 
and disillusioned that the local Protestant clergyman had refused to co-
officiate at his wedding.   
 
Was this a blurring of boundaries? I want to say that it was rather a multiplication of 
them, at once a highlighting of boundaries, a distinction of different boundaries, and a 
making  of  them  all  negotiable  and  revisable.  This  is  a  world  where  an  ordinary 
Protestant woman dances with a Sinn Féin representative, where a Southern Catholic 
can accept a hard Protestant soccer team into her moral universe and family life and 
look forward to her son watching their matches. It is a world where the resonances 
associated with the identity categories  and boundaries are split apart: the unionist 
resonances  and  sectarian  practices  of  the  soccer  team  are  distinguished  from  the 
football and the fellow feeling. It is a world where it is possible  - in the words of 
Brenda’s 8-year old daughter – to be a ‘half and halfer’, to have both ‘Protestant’ and 
                                                 
53 Robinson et al, Mixed Marriages; McClung, Mixed and Matched     GEARY WP/6/2006  27 
‘Catholic’  repertoires  and  to  move  between  worlds.  It  is  peopled  by  apolitical 
individuals, their parents and their children, with a penumbra of extended family, 
friends and acquaintances, but it has a subversive quality.
  
 
Other groups could also have been chosen to illustrate the possibilities of identity 
change in Northern Ireland.
 54 On any count, however, they are a small minority. Of 
the 160 Northern Ireland interviews, many individuals recount occasions of choice 
and change but very few show this extent of identity change and disaggregation of 
boundaries.
55 Northern Ireland is not peopled by individuals who move fluidly in and 
out of categories, until corralled by political entrepreneurs.
56  The cases discussed 
here are important not because they are typical but because they happen at all. It is all 
the more important to see what social conditions facilitate such processes, and what 
prevents them.  
 
                                                 
54 Similar subversive tendencies are more overt and politicised in the radical evangelicals described by 
Ganiel who meet in a pub, hold ‘last suppers’ and want to break the stranglehold of religious 
institutionalism and sectarian division; the activists who moved from the Northern Ireland Labour party 
to the civil rights movement to a variety of small, alternative movements; some ex-paramilitary 
Protestant community workers; a variety of small groups. There are also the individuals who ‘cross-
over’, for example the Protestants in the Social Democratic and Labour Party. Some within the 
business community, desiring political stability and economic expansion on the island of Ireland, have 
also effectively subverted Northern Irish boundaries and appear to have changed quite radically in their 
own identifications. Gladys Ganiel, ‘Emerging from the evangelical subculture in Northern Ireland’, 
International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, forthcoming.   Claire Mitchell,  ‘Protestant 
identification and political change in Northern Ireland’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 26.4, 612-31. Aaron 
Edwards and Stephen Bloomer, ‘Democratising the peace in Northern Ireland: Progressive loyalists 
and the politics of conflict transformation’, Conflict Transformation Papers no. 12, Belfast: LINC 
resource center, 2005 
55 Less than twenty; there are some interviews which are difficult to categorise and require closer 
reading, or where the interviewer did not sufficiently probe on these issues. There are eight clear cases, 
discussed here, not counting the children of mixed marriage families, with some additional examples in 
the sample from the Irish state. The movement to an alternative category (eg ‘Northern Irish’) may be 
more frequent, but it may also be less stable: see Todd et al, ‘Fluid or frozen’. 




Occasions of change: wider social context and processes.. .  
 
The occasions of change for our respondents seem ordinary, unexceptionable: visits to 
family in the South, playing hand ball at college, going to a local Protestant school, 
going to college in the North, or, for others, becoming a student politician in Belfast, 
separation and community work. The degree of contact was connected to wider social 
processes. Denise’s family linkages in the South were the product of successive 
family migrations, England to Ireland, Dublin to Belfast and back to Dublin and back 
to Belfast, partially driven by economic interest, partially by political decision (after 
the second world war to send Southern workers back to the South). Such processes 
were not atypical: Barbara spoke of her recent discovery that her grandmother had 
lived in Dublin and her desire to learn more. 
 
Sara, sent to a Protestant school, was a child of the new modern post-war Southern 
Irish nationalism, Catholic but independent of the Catholic church, suffering from a 
Catholic-run public education system unable to cope with post-war expansion. Brenda 
got involved in one of the ‘Catholic’ sports at her (Protestant) college. Jane was one 
of a new Southern generation which left the state for university education. Meanwhile 
in Northern Ireland, recent British state funding provided neutral ‘civil society’ 
venues for the teaching of the Irish (and Ulster Scots) language, European funding 
intensified cross-border activity and the ‘peace process’ provided both safe passage 
and the motivation for Sinn Féin politicians to enter the mainstream of cross-    GEARY WP/6/2006  29 
community activity.
57 While our research supports Varshney’s conclusion as to the 
importance of civil society institutions,
58 their central importance in these cases was 
less in providing resources (social capital) which could sustain cross-community 
contact and restrain polarization, than in providing experiences which produced 
identity change.  
 
Conclusion 
The discussion above suggests points of policy significance, points of comparative 
significance  about  identity  change  and  boundaries  in  situations  of  ethno-national 
conflict and some general conclusions about boundaries and identities.  
 
·  Occasions of change: Sustained contact across boundaries is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of change. Cross-community civil society institutions 
were  particularly  important  in  stimulating  identity  change.  They  threw  up 
occasions in which received wisdom and traditional oppositional categories 
might come into overt conflict with experience and values. The interviews also 
show  the  importance  of  border-crossing  networks,  which  may  have  either 
immediate  effect,  or  a  delayed  action,  being  called  upon  much  later  as 
legitimating resources. That the British and Irish governments, together with 
the  European  union,  are  now  putting  considerable  resources  into  such 
institutions  and  networks  is  of  key  importance  for  identity  change  in  the 
future.  There needs to be monitoring to ensure that there actually is cross-
community interaction within these, but they should not be assessed simply on 
their immediate political effects.
59 When it happens, identity change can be 
sudden, but there can be long delays and threshold effects between political 
                                                 
57 Brigid Laffan and Diane Payne, Creating Living Institutions: EU Cross Border Cooperation after the 
Good Friday Agreement Armagh, Centre for Cross-Border Studies, 2001;  
58 Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Ethnic conflict and civil society: India and beyond’, World Politics, 53 (April 
2001 
59 For a useful discussion of some of the government funded initiatives, see Owen Hargie and David 
Dickson, Researching the Troubles: Social Science Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict, 
Edinburgh, Mainstream Publishers, 2003     GEARY WP/6/2006  30 
change  and  identity  change.  The  time  scale  of  identity  change  may  be 
significantly longer than the time scale of political change.    
·  Resources  for  change. These  cases  show how  moral  repertoires  within  the 
traditions of each group came to be used as critical tools of change, able to 
criticise and dissect the identities and assumptions of each group. Each of the 
four women found values and moral principles which she associated with her 
own background (family and/or religious) and which came into conflict with 
her identifications and sense of group-belonging. These values and principles 
had  universalistic  resonances:  these  women  did  not  reach  for  a  pluralist 
respect  for  traditions  which  would  be  less  able  to  criticise  their  own 
tradition.
60  Revised  national  narratives  were  sometimes  appealed  to  in 
processes of change, but less often than might have been expected.  
·  Pressures against change. The stories recounted here are complex, with many 
stages where reversals could happen.  They can be countered by processes of 
‘essentialisation’,  a  simpler  and  more  immediate  reaction  against 
stigmatisation and danger and in our interviews significantly more common 
than  the  change  away  from  opposition.  To  facilitate  the  types  of  change 
discussed  here,  an  immediate  policy  recommendation  is  to  put  in  place 
safeguards against and procedures for redress for such cases of stigmatisation, 
injustice and threat: the sort of equality and rights legislation that is slowly 
being  put  into  place  in  Northern  Ireland.
61  This  can  help  prevent  future 
processes of essentialisation. It can also ease processes of change for those 
who have already reacted in this way, who would require greater safeguards 
and guarantees than did the individuals discussed above.
62   
·  The  character  of  ethno-national  conflict  and  of  settlement  structures.  The 
discussion  suggests  that  the  currently  dominant  ‘realist’  vs 
‘transformationalist’  paradigms  on  ethnic  conflict  and  settlement  are 
                                                 
60 M. Lamont, The Dignity of the Working Man: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class and 
Immigration. Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2000 
61 See McGarry and O’Leary Consociational Engagements: Oxford University Press, 2005. For 
individuals who have already reacted in this way, any process of change would be contingent on a level 
of recognition and guarantees of respect/safety that were considerably more overt than those required 
by the four women above. 
62 There is material in the data set on ‘de-essentialisation’ processes which requires further analysis.       GEARY WP/6/2006  31 
themselves  misconceived.
63  Ethno-national  identity  is  persistent,  and 
continuing  inequality,  injustice  and  perceived  humiliation  reproduces 
oppositional  ‘essentialised’  forms  of  identity.  Strong  equality  legislation  is 
therefore necessary.  But there is a question how this legislation should be 
justified. It is presently justified by pluralist or ‘liberal nationalist’ arguments 
that  give  little  hold  to  criticise  existing  traditions  and  identities.  If 
universalistic  values  are  important  in  identity  change,  a  different  tack  is 
necessary, one that justifies national equality not on liberal nationalist grounds 
but as a transitional stage or threshold towards further change.
64   
·  Boundaries  This  case  study  shows  identity  change  and  boundary  blurring 
which  involves  not  a  gradual  decline  in  the  salience  of  oppositions,  but  a 
change in their content, not assimilation but a remaking of traditions and a 
partial disaggregation of groupness, not fitting into a blurred area of symbolic 
(and social) boundaries, but the creation of such an area. This is particularly 
urgent in situations of ethnic conflict where the existing boundaries lead to 
appalling effects.  It is not new to point out that similar processes may also 
take place at other boundaries and interfaces. Yet the case studied here may 
give  some  suggestions  useful  in  other  cases.  In  cases  where  boundaries 
involve a multiplicity of symbolic divisions, the work involved in separating 
them out at once remakes identities and traditions; it shows transgression by 
conservatives  who  do  not  wish  to  depart  fully  from  their  (collective  and 
individual) past. If the Northern Ireland case is anything to go by, it may take 
place in multiple, sometimes unexpected, sites.    
                                                 
63 For some of the debates, see McGarry and O’Leary, Consociational Engagements, and R. Wilson 
and R. Wilford, ‘Northern Ireland: A route to stability’, Belfast: Democratic Dialogue. 
64 In a forthcoming work, Ruane and Todd argue for national equality as a ‘threshold’ of change. 